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SEPARATION OF RELIGION AND STATE IN JAPAN:
A PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 20
AND 89 OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
Andrew B. Van Winkle†
Abstract: Article 20 of Japan’s Constitution establishes freedom of religion. To
protect this freedom, the provisions of Articles 20 and 89 separate religion from the state
to prevent the return of State Shintō. Despite this separation, the Japanese Supreme
Court has consistently upheld instances where state entities interact with religious groups.
These decisions have raised the ire of numerous academics and legal professionals in and
out of Japan who believe that Japan’s constitutional separation requires absolute
separation, or at least something more stringent than the Supreme Court has been willing
to find. Although this comment rejects the approach taken by the Supreme Court in these
cases, it also seeks to rebut the arguments of scholars and professionals opposed to these
decisions by reinterpreting these articles in a way that still comports with the results
reached in these Supreme Court cases.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1977 Tsu City Groundbreaking case, legal scholars and
professionals have debated Japan’s constitutional freedom of religion. The
Tsu City case was Japan’s first case since World War II to define religious
freedom. 1 The case required the Supreme Court to decide the degree to
which Articles 20 and 89 of Japan’s Constitution, dealing with separation of
religion and state, limit state entities from interacting with religious
organizations.2 Answering this question, the Court held that these articles
created less than absolute constraints on religious activity.3 This decision led
to a vigorous academic debate to define the terms, context, and application
of Articles 20 and 89. In the decades following Tsu City, the scholarly
debate continued, fueled by Supreme Court decisions that, in all but one
case, reaffirmed Tsu City’s holding.
Interestingly, this debate is radically one-sided: almost every article
on the topic condemns the Supreme Court’s rationale in Tsu City and
subsequent decisions reaffirming that result. Critics primarily complain
about the Supreme Court’s refusal to defer to Article 20’s seemingly absolute
language, and criticize the court for upholding what they perceive as
†

J.D. candidate at the University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2012.
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, Sho 46 (gyo-tsu) no. 69, 31(4) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 533, translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF JAPAN 1970 THROUGH 1990, at 478-92 (1996) [hereinafter Tsu City].
2
Id.
3
Id. at 480.
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patently unconstitutional outcomes. But, if this criticism is valid, and these
decisions are repugnant to Japan’s Constitution, then why does the Supreme
Court continue to reaffirm Tsu City?
This comment seeks to answer this question and rebut the prevailing
academic view through a reinterpretation of Articles 20 and 89. In
reinterpreting Japan’s constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion
through the separation of religion and the state, this comment examines the
Japanese Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tsu City and its progeny, common
Japanese principles of interpretation, the underlying purpose of Articles 20
and 89, and current public policy considerations. Using these sources, this
comment argues that Japanese courts can reasonably interpret these articles
to permit significant interaction between the state and religious groups and
that the Constitution does not require absolute or even strict separation of
religion and the state.
Part II of this comment begins with a brief history of religion and state
in Japan, which frames the current debate, before introducing the text of
Articles 20 and 89. Part III first reviews the Japanese Supreme Court cases
that interpret these articles, and then discusses various academic and
Supreme Court interpretations and the problems that arise from those
interpretations. Part IV reassesses Articles 20 and 89 under prevailing
principles of Japanese legal interpretation and offers a new test to analyze
whether future situations violate these constitutional provisions. Finally,
Part V concludes with a summary of the debate, and where this new
interpretation fits within that debate.
II.

THE LONG HISTORY OF RELIGIONS AND THE STATE IN JAPAN DIRECTLY
INFLUENCED THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLES 20 AND 89

Understanding this constitutional debate concerning Articles 20 and
89 requires a brief historical overview of the Japanese state’s historical
comingling with, and abuse of, religion. In 538 A.D., a delegation from the
Korean peninsula introduced Buddhism to the Yamato court, which until that
point had adhered to the religious authority of Amaterasu (the sun-goddess)
and her human descendants.4 In 593, Prince Shōtoku took power, unified
Japan, and established Buddhism as the state religion.5 Buddhism, Shintō,
and their various schools were largely tolerant, if not syncretic, until the
middle of the thirteenth century when the monk Nichiren introduced a new
4
MASAHARU ANESAKI, HISTORY OF JAPANESE RELIGION: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
SOCIAL AND MORAL LIFE OF THE NATION 32-33, 53 (1930).
5
Id. at 57.
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school of Buddhist practice that scorned all other religions, for which the
state eventually exiled him. 6 In the centuries following the end of the
Kamakura period (1185–1333), Japan devolved into warlordism, marked by
intense clan fighting and even outright warfare between religious sects.7 In
1549, amid this civil war, St. Francis Xavier introduced Christianity to
Japan, which Japan’s reunifier, Shōgun Oda Nobunaga, nominally
embraced.8
Christianity’s general acceptance lasted until 1615, when Shōgun
Tokugawa Ieyasu banished the missionaries and fostered active persecution
of Christians and Nichiren Buddhists.9 Although Buddhism continued as
Japan’s state religion, it had become a mere tool for the government to
maintain control.10
When the Meiji Restoration began in 1868, another major shift
occurred in the state’s relationship with religion. In 1868, Shintō became the
state religion, and the government ordered its separation from Buddhism to
help legitimate the new ruling structure.11 This separation resulted in strict
regulation of all religions, and Shintō priests used their new positions of
favor to “plunder” Buddhist temples.12 Throughout the State Shintō era, a
wave of new religions arose in Japan. However, the government violently
suppressed these groups, 13 despite constitutionally guaranteeing religious
freedom.14
After World War II, Japan transitioned into a new socio-religious
climate, which has endured through today. In 1945, the Allied Occupation
quickly dismantled State Shintō and formally ended the Meiji government’s
suppression of all other religions. To keep the Japanese state from ever
reviving State Shintō, the Diet 15 ratified the Articles 20 and 89, which
protect freedom of religion and ban state support for religious organizations,
thus framing the debate over Japanese religious freedom.16
6

Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 229-39.
8
Id. at 241, 244.
9
Id. at 250-53.
10
Id. at 260.
11
HELEN HARDACRE, SHINTŌ AND THE STATE 1868-1988, at 27-28 (1989).
12
Id. at 28-29.
13
Id. at 126-28.
14
See DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [MEIJI KENPŌ] [MEIJI CONSTITUTION], art. 28, available at
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c02.html#s2.
15
The Diet is the name of Japan’s national legislative body.
16
See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION]. “Kenpō” is the Japanese word for
“constitution.” This comment uses the English translations of the Japanese Constitution published by the
Japanese Attorney General’s Office and the National Diet Library. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S OFFICE,
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN AND CRIMINAL LAWS (1951); The Constitution of Japan, NATIONAL DIET
7
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Japan’s current Constitution contains two articles that affect religions:
Articles 20 and 89. Chapter III of the Constitution, setting forth the “Rights
and Duties of the People,” contains Article 20,17 which provides
1) Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious
organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor
exercise any political authority.
2) No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious
act, celebration, rite or practice.
3) The State and its organs shall refrain from religious
education or any other religious activity.18
On its face, Article 20 appears to guarantee absolute freedom of
religion by not setting forth any exceptions to that right; the repeated use of
the word translated as “shall” is usually read as an absolute obligatory
requirement. This unwavering obligation receives further support from the
Article’s prohibitive language, “shall refrain,” which takes power away from
the state.
Article 89 is found within Chapter VII of the Japanese Constitution,
the chapter on “Finance.”19 Article 89 has two parts:
1) No public money or other property shall be expended or
appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious
institution or association, or
2) for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not
under the control of public authority.20
Article 89 limits the government’s power to expend funds on religious
and other non-governmental entities. 21 Although the article distinguishes
religious organizations in 89(1) from all other non-governmental
organizations in 89(2), the article nonetheless equally prohibits the
government from expending public funds for both of these types of groups.

LIBRARY, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2012) (based on the
English Edition by the Government Printing Bureau).
17
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], ch. III.
18
Id. art. 20.
19
Id. art. 89.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT HAS FAILED TO OFFER A WORKABLE
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 20 AND 89

Beginning with the 1977 Tsu City case, this Part will review the facts
of these cases and the Supreme Court’s rationale for each resulting decision,
and will then discuss the prevailing academic critiques of these cases.
A.

The Japanese Supreme Court Cases Defining Articles 20 and 89
Permit Significant Interaction Between Religions and State

Over the past forty years, the Japanese Supreme Court has decided
only a handful of cases concerning the separation of religions from the
state. 22 All of these cases stemmed from complaints of unconstitutional
interaction between the state and the Shintō religion. In all but two cases,
the Supreme Court has upheld the challenged state action.
1.

The Tsu City Groundbreaking Case Established the Purpose and
Effects Test Used by Japanese Courts in Cases Involving Articles 20
and 89

The controversy in this case began when the mayor of Tsu City spent
public funds on a Shintō purification ceremony at the groundbreaking for a
new city gymnasium.23 Disagreeing with this expenditure, one of the city’s
councilmembers sued the mayor. 24 The city councilman alleged that the
expenditure violated Articles 20 and 89 because Article 20 establishes
freedom of religion and separates religion and state, and Article 89 forbids,
inter alia, the use of public funds to benefit religious organizations.25 Given
the articles’ broad reach, the mayor’s payment to a religious organization to
perform a ceremony at a public event appeared to violate the Constitution.
Nominally, the Supreme Court agreed that Articles 20 and 89 embody
the ideal of total separation of all religions and the state.26 However, the
Court also found this ideal unachievable because state regulation will
22

For cases on the freedom of religion as opposed to the separation of religion and state, see Saikō
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 15, 1963, Sho 36 (a) no. 485, 17(4) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ
[KEISHŪ] 302 (the Criminal Exorcism case); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 29, 2000, Hei 10 (o) no. 1081,
54 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 582 (the Jehovah’s Witness Blood Transfusion case);
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 30, 1996, Hei 8 (ku) no. 8, 50(1) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ
[MINSHŪ] 199 (the Aum Shinrikyō Dissolution case); and Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, Hei 7
(gyo-tsu) no. 74, 50(3) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 469 (the Jehovah’s Witness School
Kendō case).
23
Tsu City, supra note 1, at 479.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 480.
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inevitably interfere with a religion’s beliefs or practices in certain
circumstances. 27 More importantly, the Supreme Court stated that total
separation is undesirable because it would force the state to end current
programs that involve religious groups, such as those providing financial
assistance to private religious schools and state assistance for preserving
historic architecture owned by religious groups.28 The Court pointed out that
such total separation would ironically come full circle in that denial of “such
subsidies would impose a disadvantage on these entities simply because of
their religious nature and would inevitably result in invidious discrimination
because of religion.” For this reason, the Court concluded that total
separation is impractical and possibly unconstitutional.29
Proceeding from the premise that total separation is undesirable, the
Court next tried to reach a balanced, middle ground through the “purpose
and effects” test.30 The purpose and effects test requires state neutrality and
“prohibit[s] conduct which leads to collusion between the state and a
religion,” but “only when such activity exceeds reasonable bounds as
determined with reference to the conduct’s purpose and effects.”31
The Court introduced the purpose and effects test to explain that the
government violates Article 20(3), which prohibits the state from engaging
in religious activity, when state action
exceeds reasonable limits and which has as its purpose some
religious meaning, or the effect of which is to promote,
subsidize, or conversely, to interfere with or oppose
religion . . . . [It is not enough that the procedure of the activity
is] set by religion. The place of conduct, the average person’s
reaction to it, the actor’s purpose in holding the ceremony, the
existence and extent of religious significance, and the effect on
the average person, are all circumstances that should be
considered to reach an objective judgment based on socially
accepted ideas.32
Under this interpretation, the state cannot violate Article 20(3) just by
engaging in objectively religious activity; a court must also find that the
public subjectively considers the activity religious in nature.33 Notably, the
27
28
29

Id.
Id.
Id. Presumably, the Court would find such discrimination to be a violation of the freedom of

religion.
30
31
32
33

Id. at 480-81.
Id. at 481.
Id.
Id. at 481-82.
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purpose and effects test only applies to violations of paragraph (3) of Article
20, not to violations of paragraphs (1) and (2).34
The Tsu City Court then applied this framework, finding that inviting
and funding the ceremony did not violate Article 20(3) because the
ceremony did not
raise the religious consciousness of those attending or of people
in general or lead in any way to the encouragement or
promotion of Shintō . . . . It is absolutely inconceivable that
such a practice threatens to lead to the development of a special
relationship between the State and Shintō, or the
reestablishment of Shintō as a State religion . . . . It will not
have the effect of promoting or encouraging Shintō or of
oppressing or interfering with other religions. It therefore
should not be considered . . . prohibited by Article 20,
paragraph 3.35
Simply put, the Court held that the state can constitutionally hold a religious
ceremony so long as the ceremony does not have the obvious effect of
promoting a particular religion or impairing religious freedom.
Although the Court’s judgment reversed in favor of the state, it did not
do so unanimously. The dissent primarily looked to the purpose of Articles
20 and 89—preventing the return of State Shintō.36 Because these articles
serve a grave purpose, the dissent argued, the Court can only truly uphold
these articles’ purpose by interpreting them to require absolute separation.37
The dissent’s arguments remain important because they augment the
criticisms lodged by many of the debate’s commentators.
2.

The Self-Defense Forces Enshrinement Case Reaffirmed the Supreme
Court’s Lenient Purpose and Effects Test

Almost two decades after deciding Tsu City, the Supreme Court once
again reviewed Articles 20 and 89 in the Self-Defense Forces (“SDF”)
Enshrinement case, 38 largely reaffirming Tsu City’s rationale. The SDF
Enshrinement case had its origins in 1968, when Yasuko Nakaya’s husband
34
Id. (noting that “the two paragraphs differ in purpose, intent, and scope, and they guarantee
different freedoms”).
35
Id. at 482.
36
Id. at 483-84.
37
Id.
38
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 1, 1988, Sho 57 (o) no. 902, 42(5) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 277, translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF JAPAN 1970 THROUGH 1990, 492-516 (1996) [hereinafter SDF Enshrinement].
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died in a traffic accident while on duty as a member of the SDF.39 In the
years following this accident, a group called the SDF Friendship Association
(“SDF Friends”), a private support group, sought to have Mr. Nakaya and
other fallen SDF members enshrined (goshi) at the Yamaguchi Shintō
Gokoku, a Shintō shrine for war dead.40 When the shrine denied the request
to enshrine these deceased SDF members, SDF Friends sought assistance
from the SDF Yamaguchi Regional Liaison Office, the government’s local
SDF office.41 The SDF Regional Office facilitated SDF Friends’ subsequent
petition for enshrinement by providing guidance and general assistance to
SDF Friends when they submitted their second petition.42
When the second petition succeeded, SDF Friends informed Mrs.
Nakaya of her husband’s soon-to-be enshrinement by inviting her to the
enshrinement ceremony. 43 Mrs. Nakaya, a Christian, believed that SDF
Friends violated her freedom of religion by enshrining her husband without
her consent; she then chose to sue for rescission of the enshrinement and
damages from SDF Friends.44 Although SDF Friends was not a government
actor, the lower courts ruled for Mrs. Nakaya and held that the regional SDF
office’s aid to the SDF Friends was an unconstitutional religious activity by
a government actor.45
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court viewed this case as one of
competing religious beliefs rather than state engagement in religious activity.
The Court noted that in life, Mr. Nakaya had held no known religious
beliefs.46 However, Mrs. Nakaya did hold a Buddhist memorial service to
appease Mr. Nakaya’s father, and subsequently held a Christian memorial
service according to her own religious beliefs. 47 When Mrs. Nakaya
vocalized her disapproval to SDF Friends, Mr. Nakaya’s father wrote a letter
that requested the enshrinement proceed because he wanted to see his son
enshrined.48 In addition to these two, with their competing religious beliefs,
the Court identified a third interested and competing party—the shrine.
For Mrs. Nakaya’s claim to succeed under Tsu City’s purpose and
effects test, the Court had to find an impermissible government action in
violation of the procedural guarantee of freedom of religion provided by
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 492.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 496.
Id.
Id. at 509.
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Article 20(3). The Court first decided whether the defendants had violated
the constitutional separation of religion. It determined that the purpose and
effect of the regional office’s assistance was to raise the morale of SDF
members and their families; this was not a religious purpose and thus not a
religious activity.49
Although the Court could have ended its analysis there, having found
no religious activity, it continued. Relying on Article 20(3) as an indirect
procedural guarantee, the Court held that Mrs. Nakaya had no individual
cause of action unless the state violated the substantive rights contained in
Article 20(1) or (2).50 This diverged from Tsu City by turning Article 20(1)
into a directly enforceable right.
After determining that government action to improve troop morale
was permissible under Article 20(3), the Court turned to Mrs. Nakaya’s
claim that the shrine had violated her substantive rights under Article 20(1).
The Court denied Mrs. Nakaya’s claim by finding that the shrine was an
interested third party with the same religious freedoms as Mr. Nakaya’s wife
and father.51 The Court then ruled that it could not sustain Mrs. Nakaya’s
claim for injunctive relief and damages because to do so would in turn
violate the shrine’s religious freedom.52 This means that a person cannot
violate Article 20(1) (guaranteeing freedom of religion) when the challenged
action also represents an exercise of religious freedom. In such instances,
freedom of religion requires tolerance for the religious activities of others
“as long as such acts do not disturb his or her freedom of religion by way of
compulsion or disadvantaging the individual,” which would directly violate
Article 20(2).53
The Supreme Court’s rejection of Article 20(3) and 20(1) left
Article 20(2) as the only provision of Article 20 still available for sustaining
Mrs. Nakaya’s claim. Under Article 20(2), the Court found that the
defendants did not violate the provision because they did not compel her to
attend the ceremonies and did not restrict her from remembering her
husband in a Christian way.54 As explained in Tsu City, a person cannot
violate Article 20(2) without an outward act that has the effect of preventing
a person from independently exercising his or her beliefs. As a result, the
Court denied all relief to Mrs. Nakaya under any provision of Article 20
because 1) the enshrinement did not prevent Mrs. Nakaya from exercising
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 500.
Id.
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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her own religious beliefs, 2) no government action took place, and 3)
competing religious beliefs require tolerance.
The dissent chastised the majority for its interpretation of Article
20(1) and 20(3). Regarding Article 20(3), the dissent would have added a
third factor to the purpose and effects test by analyzing the degree of
government entanglement.55 The dissent also argued that the Regional SDF
office violated Article 20(1) when it took positive actions to facilitate the
SDF Friends’ subsequent application process to the Shintō shrine. 56 The
dissent believed this act had the effect of promoting Shintō over other
religions; thus, this action violated Article 20(1)’s prohibition on religions
receiving state privileges.57 The dissenting justices also disapproved of the
fact that the Regional Office only considered Shintō enshrinement and did
not consider obtaining recognition from other religions.58 These are valid
criticisms that the Supreme Court has yet to address.59
3.

In the Ehime Prefecture Case, the Supreme Court, for the First Time,
Found a Violation of the Separation of Religion and State

The Ehime Prefecture case 60 remains the only instance where the
Court truly ruled against the state in finding a violation of Japan’s
constitutional separation of religion and state. 61 In this case, Ehime
Prefecture had allocated public funds for offerings to Yasukuni Shrine and to
Gokoku Shrine to perform Shintō ceremonies.62 The plaintiffs challenged
cash donations (tamagushiryo) for various seasonal festivals (reitaisai) and
another type of cash donation (kumotsuryo) for memorial ceremonies
(ireitaisai).63 Challenging these donations, a group of citizens launched a
taxpayer suit against the former governor and other officials to repay the
prefecture for allegedly violating Articles 20(3) and 89.64
55
Id. at 514. Together, those three factors (purpose, effects, and excessive entanglement) comprise
the United States Supreme Court’s balancing test for separation of church and state as established in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1970).
56
SDF Enshrinement, supra note 38, at 515.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See infra Part III.B.
60
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, Hei 4 (gyo-tsu) no. 156, 51(4) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1673, translated in SERIES OF PROMINENT JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT
UPON QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY: NOS. 27-30 1996-99, NO. 30 (1999) [hereinafter Ehime].
61
In Sunagawa II, discussed infra Part III.A.6, the Court merely remanded to remedy the city’s
unconstitutional action.
62
Ehime, supra note 60, at 2.
63
Id.
64
Id.
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The majority found that the Japanese government should have a
secular nature and maintain religious neutrality because the Constitution
created an unconditional freedom of religion.65 The majority believed that
they could only truly prevent State Shintō’s return by requiring strict
separation.66 Nevertheless, the majority—with a nod to the decision in Tsu
City—accepted Article 20(3) as an indirect institutional guarantee, agreed
that total separation was not feasible, and stated that balancing under the
purpose and effects test was appropriate.67
The majority then restated Tsu City’s test for impermissible religious
activity by the state: “activities exceeding such reasonable limits, the
purpose of which have some religious meaning and the effect of which is to
support, promote, or, adversely, oppose or interfere with religion, should be
prohibited.”68 However, the Court went one step further than Tsu City by
explicitly extending the purpose and effects test beyond Article 20(3) to
Article 89;69 the Tsu City majority had only implied as much.70
Thus, applying the same test from Tsu City, the Court had to
distinguish the facts of Tsu City to explain why the offerings by Ehime
Prefecture were improper. The Court distinguished these cases by pointing
out that the offerings by Ehime Prefecture to support the shrines’ highest
ceremonies (events with extreme religious significance) went well beyond a
minor groundbreaking ceremony (an event with little religious significance)
from Tsu City.71
The majority also found fault with the form of the donations. Even
though many citizens supported the Prefecture’s donations to mourn the
nation’s war dead, the majority of the justices found such public requests
inapposite because of the significance contained in tamagushiryo and
kumotsuryo.72 The Court faulted the defendants because they had other, less
religious, methods available to achieve the same purpose of officially
mourning the war dead. The Court suggested that the Prefecture could have
made the donations as koden, an offering to families in consolation of their
deceased, whereas tamagushiryo is a donation to support the shrine’s priests;
the Court also suggested that the Prefecture could have used saisen, which,
although possessing the same meaning as a tamgushiryo, is offered
65

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
67
Id. at 4.
68
Id. at 4-5.
69
Id. at 5.
70
See Tsu City, supra note 1, at 492 (“[I]n light of the purpose and effects of the Groundbreaking
Ceremony . . . it therefore does not violate Article 89 of the Constitution.”).
71
Ehime, supra note 60, at 6.
72
Id. at 6-7.
66
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anonymously.73 Given these available alternatives, the Court found that the
Prefecture’s use of tamgushiryo gave a strong impression of a special
government relationship with Shintō to the exclusion of other religions.74
Accordingly, the Prefecture failed to narrowly tailor its actions to achieve its
purpose of mourning the nation’s war dead.
Despite the majority accepting Article 20 as a conditional freedom of
religion, concurring justices held strong to the idea of unconditional freedom
in order to guard against the return of State Shintō. 75 These justices
criticized the purpose and effects test because of its proven ineffectiveness to
coherently guide lower courts.76 Instead of keeping the test, these justices
would have held it void for vagueness.77
Although one dissenting opinion agreed with the methodology used
by the majority, it diverged in its application. This dissent considered the
Yasukuni and Gogoku shrines to have special national significance because
they serve as monuments to the war dead, thus muting the shrines’ religious
nature. 78 This distinction is critical because Article 20 only applies to
religious activity; if the challenged activity is not religious, then courts do
not need to examine the activity under the purpose and effects test.
These dissenters essentially would have added another factor to the
effect prong of the purpose and effects test. Rather than ask whether the
action created an effect that favors any one religion, the dissent would ask
whether the effect furthered a legitimate state interest that outweighed the
religious nature of the activity. 79 The dissent thought that because
government officials from all religions—not just Shintō—pay official visits
to these specific Shintō shrines, government support of these war dead
memorials constituted a legitimate state interest.80 The dissent also argued
that because the donations’ monetary value was small, there was less of a
danger that the activity could be said to promote unreasonably any one
religion over all others.81
Another dissenting opinion strictly interpreted “religious activity” to
prohibit only ceremonies actually performed by the state itself,82 which was
73

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 21.
76
Id. at 23-24, 28 (discussing multiple cases where lower trial and appellate courts applied the test
only to have their decisions reversed on appeal).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 36.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 36-37.
81
Id. at 40-43.
82
Id. at 50-51.
74
75
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a factor that also arose in Tsu City.83 In that sense, this dissent argued that
because the governor did not personally perform the ceremony, the state had
not engaged in religious activity. Considering Article 89, the dissent noted
that in all practicality, the effect of donating a sum of money to a religion is
no different than giving a tax preference based upon status as an
incorporated religion. 84 When “religious activity” is interpreted as this
dissent would interpret it, then it is inconsistent to hold that the government
can give preferences to religions in one way, but not another way, even
though both actions have the same end result. Although many Western
scholars may not agree with this ends-justify-the-means reasoning, it
permeates Japanese court opinions where, in general, pragmatism reigns to
achieve the correct ends by any reasonable means possible.85
4.

The Minō Relocation, Minō Memorial Services, and Minō Subsidy
Cases Show that the Ehime Case Did Not Set a New Standard for
Religious Separation Cases

In 1976, the Kamisakas filed the first of three suits that would
eventually make it to Japan’s Supreme Court.86 The Kamisakas alleged that
various public officials in Minō City violated Articles 20 and 89 through
material support for a local chukon-hi (war memorial).87 The Kamisakas
brought the first case against the officials for their decision to pay to relocate
the war memorial onto land owned by the school district and allow the
memorial to use the land rent-free.88 The second case demanded the officials
reimburse the city for the funds they had expended to hold Shintō and
Buddhist memorial services at the monument and for the salaries paid to
local officials who attended the services.89 The third case challenged an
annual subsidy to the Minō Chapter of the Japan Association of WarBereaved Families (“Minō JAWBF”), which the Kamisakas argued was
acting as a religious organization.90 The plaintiffs challenged the use of the
funds by the Minō JAWBF to pay for the memorial services and visits to

83

See supra Part III.A.1.
Ehime, supra note 60, at 63.
85
See infra Part IV.A.1.
86
DAVID M. O’BRIEN, TO DREAM
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Id. at 98-141.
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Yasukuni Shrine. 91 The Supreme Court decided each case against the
Kamisakas.
In the first two cases, the Court applied the Tsu City purpose and
effects test, but before doing so, found that the monument had lost all
religious significance during the occupation when the Allies severed the
monument’s formal ties to Shintō and to Yasukuni Shrine. 92 The Court
determined that the monument could not be considered an “alter ego” of
Yasukuni just because the monument at one point had enshrined war dead
whom priests at Yasukuni had also enshrined.93 Furthermore, the soldier
memorial services held there alternated between Shintō and Buddhist, so that
the monument could not be said to be an object of any one religion.94
Because the memorial had seemingly lost all religious significance
and also alternated between religions, the Court found that the effect of the
local government’s action did not give any undue support or favoritism to
one religion over another.95 The Court then absolved the public officials
who attended the ceremonies by finding that they attended out of social
courtesy.96
Regarding financial assistance to the Minō JAWBF, the Court found
that the organization served a primarily secular purpose, mooting any need
to discuss Articles 20 and 89 in that context.97 Despite the fact that the Minō
JAWBF used some of the city’s subsidy to sponsor trips to Yasukuni (a
Shintō shrine), the Court found that paying to visit a religious site did not
make the organization’s primary function religious.98 The Court supported
this analysis by citing the fact that the national organization spent decades
lobbying to improve pensions for veterans and that all the organization’s
activities centered on veterans. 99 Thus, the memorial services, although
religious, had a secular purpose of honoring veterans.100
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Id. at 127-28, 130.
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Id. at 127-28, 134.
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Id. at 129.
Id. at 127-28.
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The Daijō Sai Cases101 Show the Continued Vitality of the Purpose
and Effects Test in Japan

Three years after the Supreme Court decided the last Minō case, the
Court again took up separation of religion and state in two cases concerning
Emperor Akihito’s 1989 succession ceremony. The Third Petty Bench 102
decided the first case, a taxpayer suit against the governor and other local
officials from Ōita Prefecture. 103 The First Petty Bench, two days later,
decided a similar case against the governor and officials from Kagoshima
Prefecture.104
In both of these cases, the Imperial Household Agency had invited
local officials to attend Emperor Akihito’s succession ceremony, specifically
the Daijō sai.105 According to Shintō practice, new emperors perform the
Daijō sai, during which the emperor prays to the gods for peace and a
bountiful harvest. 106 The ceremony also serves a second function,
celebrating the emperor’s succession. 107 To attend this ceremony, the
officials expended government funds, which the plaintiffs claimed violated
Articles 20 and 89. 108 Although the ceremony is religious, the Supreme
Court ignored its religious nature and emphasized the ceremony’s secular
purpose.
Focusing on this secular purpose as the relevant purpose for the
purpose and effects test, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’
decisions to dismiss the suits. The Court found that the officials attended the
ceremony only as a celebration of Emperor Akihito as the symbol of the
Japanese state.109 Regarding the ceremony’s effect, the Court found, without
any discussion, that the ceremony neither promoted nor repressed any
religion, having an essentially neutral effect on religion.110
101
See generally Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 9, 2002, Hei 10 (gyo-tsu) no. 239, 1799 HANREI
JIHŌ 101 [hereinafter Kohno]; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 11, 2002, Hei 11 (gyo-tsu) no. 93, 56 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] No. 6 at 1204 [hereinafter Higo] (translated at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2002.7.11-1999-Gyo-Tsu-No.93.html).
Page number
citations are to the PDF page number of the opinions on the Court’s website.
102
Japan’s Supreme Court is comprised of three Petty Benches, each with five justices, and a Grand
Bench where all fifteen justices sit en banc. Most Supreme Court cases are decided by one of the three
petty benches.
103
Kohno, supra note 101.
104
Higo, supra note 101.
105
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The Sunagawa Neighborhood Association Shrine Cases111 Suggest a
Change in the Court’s Application of the Purpose and Effects Test

The Supreme Court decided the most recent cases involving the
separation of religion and the state in early 2010. The Court reviewed a pair
of cases against Sunagawa City in northern Japan. In both cases, Sunagawa
City offered city-owned lands to local neighborhood associations (“NHAs”)
without requiring compensation in return.112 In both cases, the city knew
that the NHAs would use part of the land and buildings to house Shintō
shrines that had already been on the land for decades.113 The city actually
wanted to divest itself of the shrines and corresponding property because it
thought that it needed to in order to comply with Article 89.114 The only
other option—removing the shrines—would violate Article 20.115 Instead of
being hailed for its attempt to comply with the constitution’s mandate, the
city was sued by a local group of residents for the way that it divested itself
of the shrines.116
These cases are significant because despite having nearly identical
facts, the Supreme Court found a violation of Article 89 in one case, but not
the other, thereby signaling an attempt to clarify the cumbersome purpose
and effects test. The Supreme Court distinguished the cases based on the
different ways that the city tried to divest itself of the shrines. In Sunagawa
I, the city granted the shrine land and property to the NHA.117 In Sunagawa
II, the city entered into a contract with the NHA to loan the land for use as a
shrine free of charge.118
Affirming the unconstitutionality of the city’s loan in Sunagawa II, the
Supreme Court listed several options for making the transfer that would not
have violated Article 89: grant, transfer for value, and lease at fair market
value.119 Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the city’s loan contract
111
See generally Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 20, 2010, Hei 19 (gyo-tsu) no.334, 64(1) SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 128 [hereinafter Sunagawa I] (translated at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2010.01.20-2007.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..334.html); Saikō
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 20, 2010, Hei 19 (gyo-tsu) no. 260, 64(1) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ
[MINSHŪ] 1 [hereinafter Sunagawa II] (translated at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2010.0
1.20-2007.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..260.html). Page number citations are to the PDF page number of the opinions on
the Court’s website.
112
Cases cited supra note 111.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Sunagawa I, supra note 111, at 1.
118
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violated the Constitution, but remanded with instructions for the lower court
to examine constitutional alternatives to removing the shrine.120
In upholding the city’s action in Sunagawa I and condemning it in
Sunagawa II, the Supreme Court adhered to the purpose and effects test, but
with a new emphasis. The Court never mentioned purpose in Sunagawa I; it
mentioned it only briefly in Sunagawa II, and only to state that the city’s
initial secular purpose was not sufficient to comply with the Articles 20 and
89.121 The Court’s failure to mention the purpose prong in the first case and
only briefly mention it in the second case appears to signal that the Court
sees purpose as a secondary and marginal factor, compared to the effects
factor.
The Court put a new emphasis on the effects requirement by
rephrasing and combining the effects criteria from the prior cases:
Article 89 of the Constitution can be construed to prohibit the
state’s or local public entity’s connection with religion in cases
where its connection with religion in terms of appropriating
public property for use, etc. is found to be beyond the limit that
is deemed to be reasonable, in light of the social and cultural
conditions of our country, in relation to the fundamental
purpose of the system of securing guarantee of freedom of
religion.122
This test combines elements of the prior cases with its reference to social
and cultural conditions and reasonable limits, while maintaining that the
public’s point of view still serves as the benchmark for reasonableness.
However, the Sunagawa II Court dropped the original effects prong, which
asked whether the “effect of which is to promote, subsidize, or conversely, to
interfere with or oppose religion.”123
Further clarifying effects, the Court identified circumstances where
state-owned religious property might not violate Article 89:
For instance, a facility that has the nature of a religious facility
in general terms can be, at the same time, protected as historic
or cultural property. Such facilit[ies] often ha[ve] other
meanings as tourist resources, means of promoting international
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goodwill, places where local residents cultivate mutual
friendship, and so forth.124
By developing these hypotheticals, the Court appeared to imply that each
would be seen as within reasonable limits when viewed by the public.
Although the Grand Bench unanimously decided in favor of the city
in Sunagawa I, the Court fractured in Sunagawa II, with nine Justices either
concurring or dissenting. Justice Fujita presented the most important
concurring opinion. Although he approved of the purpose and effects test,
he also recognized that the Court needed to address the arguments presented
by academics and in prior dissenting opinions.125 In pointing out that the
Court’s precedents are not “the absolute rule,” he called for a more searching
purpose and effects test that would take a hard look at all the facts and
circumstances surrounding alleged constitutional violations.126
In his dissent, Justice Horigome argued that the purpose prong of the
test merited more attention, primarily through a close examination of the
religious nature of the action at issue.127 The concurring opinion of Justice
Kondo outright rejected this approach as an inappropriate risk-based test.128
Justice Tahara and Justice Kondo rejected the relaxed approach advocated by
Justice Horigome because they viewed the constitutional separation as
absolute. 129 Also acknowledging the inadequacy of the majority’s
application of the law to the facts, the concurring opinion of Justices
Kainaka, Nakagawa, Furuta, and Takeuchi advocated a closer, more
comprehensive examination of the facts; these Justices would require a large
trial record that includes more local history, more information regarding the
religious entity, and facts regarding the local population’s relationship with
the entity.130 Although Sunagawa II generated a plurality of opinions, one
thing pulls them together: the need for a new test to remedy the inadequacy
of the decades-old purpose and effects test. The rest of this comment is
dedicated to addressing that need.

124
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Sunagawa II, supra note 111, at 9.
Id. at 14-16 (Fujita, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 39-40 (Horigome, J., dissenting).
Id. at 27-28 (Kondo, J., concurring).
Id. at 20-21 (Tahara, J., concurring), 27-28 (Kondo, J., concurring).
Id. at 34-35 (Kainaka, Nakagawa, Furuta, and Takeuchi, JJ., concurring).
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The Prevailing Academic View Accurately Critiques the Supreme
Court’s Test, but Fails to Provide an Adequate Replacement

As discussed in Part II of this comment, Article 20 appears to
guarantee absolute freedom of religion by not providing any explicit
exceptions to that freedom. The only exceptions provided in the Article
withhold power from the state in order to protect that religious freedom.131
However, if Article 20 did so operate—isolated from all other laws, legal
principles, and constitutional provisions—the Supreme Court’s results in all
but Ehime and Sunagawa II would appear paradoxical. Over the past
decade, law professors from Japan, the United States, and other countries
have leveled this criticism at the Japanese government’s approach to Article
20, and in particular, the premise that Article 20 does not require total
separation.132
That premise constitutes one of the main sticking points among
critics. The Supreme Court in Tsu City supported its premise of limited
separation by explaining that “an actual system of government that attempts
a total separation of religion and the state is virtually impossible.”133 The
dissent in Tsu City argued to the contrary that the Japanese state in fact
needed to sever all religious ties to prevent a return to State Shintō.134
However, the Tsu City dissent’s argument is problematic because it
summarily dismisses the majority’s premise that absolute separation is
impossible, and it further fails to explain how Japan can realistically achieve
absolute separation. Such a hard-line textualist view of Article 20(1)’s
prohibition on any state privileges is untenable. To achieve absolute
separation, Japan would have to repeal the Religious Juridical Persons Law,
because the Law contains numerous privileges conferred by the state on
religions.135 However, such a result would go against the Diet’s intent in
ratifying Article 20.136 Although strict separation would require repealing
this and other laws, none of the strict separation supporters have gone so far
as to advocate repeal. If these critics in practice do not want to adhere to
131

See supra Part II.
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133
Tsu City, supra note 1.
134
Id. at 483-84.
135
See generally Shukyō hōjinhō [Religious Juridical Persons Law] 1995. This statute allows
religions, inter alia, to incorporate, receive tax benefits, and own land. See id.
136
See infra Part IV.A.3.
132

382

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 21 NO. 2

strict textualism, then there must be some other reason for criticizing the
Court’s decisions in this area.
Rather than attacking the Court’s failure to require total separation,
other critics accept the premise that total separation is impossible, but
instead attack the purpose and effects test for not providing enough
separation. In the SDF Enshrinement case, the dissent wanted the majority
to adopt the rest of the Lemon v. Kurtzman purpose and effects test from the
United States Supreme Court. 137 In Lemon, the U.S. Supreme Court
analyzed the propriety of state activities that implicate religion by asking 1)
whether the activity had a secular purpose, 2) whether its principal or
primary effect was one that neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and 3)
whether the activity fostered “an excessive government entanglement with
religion.”138 This third prong is what the Japanese Supreme Court left out of
its adaptation of Lemon’s purpose and effects test. Many academics criticize
the Japanese test as too lenient because it does not use “excessive
entanglement” as an additional factor for scrutinizing government action.139
The Court’s critics also deride Japan’s purpose and effects test as
impractical. The concurring Justices in the Ehime case would have held the
purpose and effects test void for vagueness, and the Justices in Sunagawa II
agreed through their numerous critiques of the test. 140 These Justices
pointed to numerous lower and appellate court cases where courts apply the
test, but frequently come to conflicting results in similar cases.141 These
empirical results strongly support these critics’ argument that the test is
impractical.
One significant reason for this impracticality comes from the Supreme
Court’s tactic of deferring to the “average Japanese person” when avoiding
judicial review of government actions. The Court does this by basing a
case’s outcome on a determination that “the average Japanese person is not
offended by these [religious] practices and that the average Japanese
[person] does not view them as religious acts.”142 The Japanese Supreme
Court uses this determination as a condition precedent to applying the
purpose and effects test by concluding that if the challenged activity does
not qualify as religious, then no constitutional violation could have possibly
137
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occurred. This approach is defective because the Court has yet to define
what circumstances would fall into the category of religious acts.
While this comment argues that the Supreme Court reached the proper
result in these cases, some of the critiques presented by commentators and
dissenting Justices are compelling. Avoiding constitutional questions by
holding that an apparently religious activity is not religious because it is
secular in the eyes of the people can only go so far. At some point, the
courts will have to hear a case where the average person finds an act
religious and employ a more practical test to determine whether the action
violates the Constitution. Currently, after finding an activity is religious, the
courts go on to apply the purpose and effects test. However, as discussed
above, Japanese courts have not been able to uniformly apply this test.
Because this test has been shown to be impracticable, this comment agrees
that Japan should abandon the purpose and effects test, but not because the
Japanese Constitution requires strictly separating religion from the state.
IV.

FASHIONING A NEW INTERPRETATION FOR JAPAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL
SEPARATION OF RELIGION AND STATE REQUIRES AN UNDERSTANDING
OF JAPANESE METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Having examined Japan’s religious history, the current state of the
law, and various critiques of the law, this Part turns to Japan’s future.
Section A reinterprets Articles 20 and 89 in light of their original intent and
contemporary public policy considerations. In line with this reinterpretation,
Section B proposes a new test for deciding cases of separation of religion
and state in Japan.
A.

Pragmatism, Purposivism, and Societal Norms Shape Japanese
Constitutional Interpretation

Fashioning a new test for questions arising out of Articles 20 and 89
first requires a reinterpretation of these articles. The following sections
show that Japan uses many of the same interpretive methods, but often with
less of an emphasis on text.
1.

Japan’s Interpretive Process Foremost Relies on Pragmatism, thus
Focusing on a Law’s Purpose Over Its Text

Japanese courts rarely rely on text alone to determine the outcome of
sensitive cases dealing with rights and constitutional law. In fact, Japanese
courts occasionally bend the black letter law because Japan recognizes
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custom and natural reason as collateral sources of law. 143 Although the
result may violate a statute, judges would rather come to a reasoned outcome
that takes societal policies into account than take a rule to its logical and
sometimes absurd end.144 Japanese courts essentially value substance over
form.
An everyday example of this occurs in Japanese marriage law. Article
739 of the Civil Code requires couples to register their marriages before they
become legally effective.145 Over the years, Japanese courts have taken the
marriage law and interpreted it to extend benefits to de facto marriages, even
recognizing de facto divorces.146 Consequently, the courts have rendered
statutory provisions requiring registration of a marriage with the state
virtually unnecessary.
An even more striking example of Japan’s belief in pragmatic
reasoning concerns the constitutional rights of the accused. In Hashimoto,
the Japanese Supreme Court explicitly contradicted the plain meaning of the
law’s text to achieve a pragmatic result.147 In that case, the Supreme Court
interpreted Articles 31 and 35 of the Constitution. Article 31 prohibits
criminal penalties from being imposed except according to lawful
procedures. 148 Article 35 limits what constitutes lawful procedure when
seizing evidence. 149 Police arrested Hashimoto; he was convicted of
narcotics possession after a body search by police found narcotics.150 The
police violated Hashimoto’s right to be free from illegal seizure when they
performed the search without his consent or a reasonable apprehension of
danger to warrant an involuntary search.151
Despite this unlawful seizure, the Japanese Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the prosecution’s use of the evidence at trial.152 The
Supreme Court began its decision by admitting a constitutional violation had
occurred because “the officer . . . seriously violated the privacy of the
individual. The officer’s action was an unreasonable search under the

143
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circumstances . . . . [Consequently,] the evidence must be said to have been
seized unlawfully as part of the arrest.”153
Nonetheless, the Court went on to base its holding on pragmatic
principles:
[I]n a situation in which the requisites for an official
interrogation existed, and the necessity and the urgent
conditions for examining the personal effects were recognized,
and the defendant did not make a clear response as to whether
or not he would comply with the officer’s request, the officer
exceeded only a little the limits of the law . . . . From the
beginning, the officer had no intention to neglect any law or
regulation connected with principles requiring the warrant, nor
was there any evidence of use of physical force by the officer in
examining the personal effects. The evidence in this case
should be admitted.154
In effect, the Court weighed Hashimoto’s privacy rights against societal
rights and expectations and determined that, in context, the officer’s actions
did not constitute a glaring offense.155
Furthermore, although Hashimoto had only violated narcotics
possession laws, the Court identified other important public welfare factors
for ensuring his confinement, including his known mafia affiliation. 156
Hashimoto stands for the principle that pragmatic reasoning, which looks to
the underlying purposes behind statutes, can matter more than the text used
to achieve those purposes. In essence, the means specified by the Diet have
less importance than the ends that those means serve to achieve.
2.

A Purely Textual Interpretation Is Impossible Because the
Constitution’s Ambiguous Text Does Not Fully Define the Boundaries
of Japan’s Freedoms

Although the text alone will not determine a case, the cases in this
section show that Japanese courts will sometimes use canons of statutory
interpretation when interpreting text. As previously discussed in Part II of
this comment, the provisions of Article 20 individually and together may
153
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give readers the sense that religious freedom is absolute.157 Although this
seems a natural reading, the term “absolute” is absent from the Article.
Without the presence of a qualifier such as “guaranteed without exception or
restraint” or “except as otherwise provided,” the degree of constitutionallyguaranteed religious freedom remains ambiguous.
When resolving these sorts of ambiguities, Japanese courts have
looked to canons of statutory interpretation. For example, in interpreting a
statute that listed kisha (steam train) and densha (electric train), a court
extended the statute to gas-powered trains by using the canon whereby items
in a list are considered to imply the inclusion of other items in the same
class.158 In another case, the Supreme Court applied the canon whereby the
expression of one thing necessarily excludes all others. The statute in that
case prohibited public servants from supporting or opposing a particular
candidate, but as interpreted by the Court, did not apply to a person who
intended to be a candidate.159 However, the Court ignored that same canon
in another case where it extended the term mono (usually understood to
pertain to tangible things) to include electricity because humans can capture
electricity, making non-tangible electricity tangible enough as far as the
criminal statute was concerned.160 As these cases demonstrate, Japan may
use canons of textual interpretation, but the courts do not always rely on
these canons consistently.
One interpretive rule that the Supreme Court has applied consistently
requires reading articles of the Constitution in context of the whole; this
holds especially true when interpreting fundamental rights in Japan. Article
20 appears in Chapter III, titled “Rights and Duties of the People.” The
reference to duties suggests that Japan views rights more as privileges, or
qualified rights. 161 Although constitutions generally give fundamental
human rights, such as religious freedom, more deference and fewer
restrictions than other rights, the Japanese Constitution, through the context
of Article 12, imposes duties that limit these rights:
The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this
Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of
the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms
157
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and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for
the public welfare.162
That final clause concerning the public welfare has been read to limit the
manner in which the Japanese people can exercise all other constitutionally
protected rights. Japan scholars widely know this rights-versus-duties
relationship as the public welfare doctrine.
The Supreme Court most famously discussed the public welfare
doctrine in the Lady Chatterley’s Lover case.163 In that case, the Supreme
Court affirmed the criminal convictions on obscenity charges of a prominent
novelist and a reputable publisher. The charges stemmed from these
individuals’ roles in the distribution and sale of a widely popular translation
of D.H. Lawrence’s sexually-charged novel, Lady Chatterley’s Lover.164 The
Court recognized the artistic value of the novel, as protected by Article 21’s
guaranteed freedom of expression, but also recognized that the presence of
artistic value does not mutually exclude obscenity.165 In extending public
welfare as a justification for criminalizing obscenity and using it as a
limitation on Article 21, the Court cited eight previous cases where it had
read constitutionally-protected rights in context with Articles 12 and 13.166
It is therefore appropriate, if not necessary, to read Article 20’s guaranteed
freedom of religion in context with the public welfare limits outlined in
Article 12.
3.

The Government’s Original Understanding of Articles 20 and 89 Calls
for a Loose Interpretation, Allowing for Broad Interaction Between
the State and Religions

Although Article 20 contains a textual ambiguity by failing to define
the extent of Japan’s religious freedom, the rest of the Constitution provides
context for setting the limits on this freedom. This context comes from
Article 12, which defines Article 20 according to the public welfare.
However, because the Constitution does not define public welfare, Article 20
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cannot be fully understood without first looking outside the Constitution to
define Article 12’s public welfare and the limits it places on rights.
Courts may define the proper bounds of rights through legislative
intent, which is usually contained in legislative debates or in commentary
written by the drafters. Typically, Japanese courts do not cite to legislative
history, but the courts do periodically use this history to informally guide
their decisions.167
In examining the current Japanese Constitution, readers should keep
in mind that the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (“SCAP”) 168
drafted these provisions. Article 89, as well as Article 20’s separation
clause, did not appear in the drafting process until the United States
submitted its February 1946 draft.169 According to Kenzō Takayanagi,170 the
Diet adopted these provisions under a feeling of duress:
In 1946, when I participated in the making of the present
Constitution, I believed that it was “imposed” upon Japan . . . .
There is no doubt that such acceptance was gained by the
superior military force of the Allied Powers, and that such
policy [of democratization] was “forced” upon the Japanese
government . . . . I was not then aware of the Moscow
Agreement 171 . . . [and] thought SCAP was entitled to impose
any constitutional text upon Japan . . . . I imagined also that the
acceptance by Japan of this “imposed” Constitution might be
one of the terms of the future peace treaty . . . . No legislation
was enacted by the “free will of the Japanese” in the sense that
enactment was accomplished “without any outside
interference.”172
Because the Constitution is not wholly a Japanese Constitution, textual
interpretation should not provide the only lens for analyzing its provisions.
Instead, scholars can best understand the constitution’s text not only through
167
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examining SCAP’s intent where it added certain provisions, but also through
the ratifying Diet’s interpretation of those provisions to fit Japan’s needs.
When SCAP drafted Articles 20 and 89, it intended to “purge” Shintō
from the state, regardless of the results of such policy. 173 As one SCAP
draftsman stated: “We simply wanted to separate religion from the state.
That was all there was to it. We were not concerned about any theories
regarding church-state relations.”174 In other words, SCAP inserted Articles
20 and 89 solely to eliminate Shintō as a source of ultra-nationalism that
could hinder pacification; SCAP had no concern in drafting those provisions,
whatsoever, for the ideals of religious freedom. Because SCAP failed to
consider public policy, strict reliance on the text of the separation articles is
ill-advised without first considering what public policies will be advanced or
hindered by separation.
Although SCAP did not stop to consider Japan’s best interests, the
Diet was not so short-sighted. Looking to the policies embodied by the text
of these articles, members in both the House of Representatives and House
of Peers raised concerns whether Article 20(1) was an absolute freedom.175
In addressing these concerns, Japan’s executive branch assured the Diet that
Article 12 (public welfare) worked in conjunction with Article 20 to limit
freedom for the public welfare.176 The government also assured the Diet that
provisions limiting government interference with religion were not selfexecuting, but would be enacted by statute and protected in the courts by due
process. 177 This original interpretation from the Japanese government
supports the holding in the SDF Enshrinement case that the separation
clauses provide an institutional guarantee and not an individually
enforceable right.178
Japan’s history of nationalism and religious persecution may provide a
dual framework for interpreting Article 20. During the constitutional
debates, Matsudaira Narimitsu of the House of Peers, in line with SCAP’s
intent, understood every sentence after Article 20(1) as merely a mechanism
“to prevent the government’s imposition of a particular religion that
emphasizes ultra-nationalistic ideology.”179 However, Mr. Kanamori of the
Japanese government understood these additional provisions as keeping the
173
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state from actively or passively influencing any religion.180 Mr. Kanamori
likely had in mind the Meiji government’s forced revision of religious
doctrines, as happened to the religion Tenrikyō, and the baseless harassment
of religious groups, as happened to the religions Ōmoto and Hito no
Michi. 181 Under the government’s interpretation, Article 20 served two
purposes: 1) to prevent the government from reestablishing a state religion,
and 2) to prevent the government from harassing religions. To those ends,
Japan should limit Article 20 to provide the most flexibility for the Diet and
the courts to consider the public welfare in addressing inevitable contacts
between religion and government.
Although SCAP’s purpose behind Articles 20 and 89 did not focus on
religions, the text is impliedly for the benefit of religions. Because these
provisions directly impact religions, scholars should also consider what sort
of freedom and separation Japanese religions’ adherents desired. Religious
leaders and Diet members alike expressed deep concern over the practical
implications of these articles, especially Article 89.182 When the Diet ratified
the Constitution, the Religions League of Japan (Nihon Shūkyō Remmei),
representing Shintō, Buddhist, and Christian leaders, expressed
dissatisfaction with Articles 20 and 89.183 Religious leaders feared that these
articles would end all special privileges for religions, including tax
exemptions and rent-free use of lands.184
Addressing these concerns, the Japanese government assured the Diet
and religious leaders that Article 89 would not take away the prior privileges
open to all religions. 185 Regarding Article 20, the government further
clarified that the provision requires the government to respect all religions
equally, without emphasizing one religion to the exclusion of others. 186
Therefore, while the text can be read to require strict separation, the Diet and
religious groups only intended to ensure that all religions have equal
opportunity to enjoy government privileges.
Diet members also raised concerns regarding the Article 20(3)
prohibition against the government directly engaging in religious activity.
Responding to those worries, the Japanese government informed the Diet
that “it was perfectly acceptable for public schools to offer religious
180
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programs as extracurricular activities, as long as the school did not restrict
itself to one religion.”187 The government further explained that the Ministry
of Education would “encourage activities such as alumni groups inviting
various religious authorities for lectures, and that [the government] saw no
problem with the principal of the public school initiating or actively
participating in such activities.” 188 Given the Japanese government’s
original understanding of these provisions as narrow limitations, the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Tsu City, Minō, and other religious activity
cases do not appear out of line with the constitutional interpretation that
government actors may support religion, as long as they do not deny other
religions an opportunity to work with the state as well.
4.

Japan Should Define the Constitutionally-Required Degree of
Religious Separation by Current Societal Standards Because Japanese
Courts Recognize a “Living Constitution”

Although narrowly tailoring Article 20’s restrictions on government
interaction with religion comports with the Article’s legislative history,
scholars should remember that Japan’s form of constitutionalism tempers
any such interpretation. Japan’s Constitution is a living Constitution;189 this
means that what may have been constitutional at the time of drafting will not
necessarily remain constitutional as the years pass.
The Chatterley decision provides an excellent example of Japan’s
belief in a living Constitution. In the Chatterley case, the Court announced
that the test for whether something constitutes obscenity, and thus violates
the public welfare, is determined by “the good sense operating generally
through the society, that is, the prevailing ideas of society.”190 However, one
must keep in mind that what constitutes “prevailing ideas of society” is a
judgment of law—not fact.191
Just because judicial discretion defines the shifts in public welfare
does not mean that Japan’s societal standards go unchanged. In Repeta v.
187
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Japan, the Japanese Supreme Court reversed a trial judge’s ruling on the
grounds that the public welfare interests had diminished.192
The case started when a trial judge prevented Lawrence Repeta, a
prominent American legal scholar, from taking research notes while
observing the judge’s trial. 193 Repeta challenged the order as an
unconstitutional restraint on freedom of expression and as inequitable as
applied because the court allowed the press corps to take notes during the
trial.194
Addressing Repeta’s challenge, the Supreme Court began its opinion
by affirming the standard that “rational restriction” (gōriteki seigen) can
limit any freedom.195 In determining whether the restriction had a rational
basis, the Supreme Court reversed, finding the trial judge’s rationale
obsolete because present day circumstances had diminished the need for
such public welfare restrictions:
[T]he instant measure should be said to be an exercise of the
courtroom policing power lacking a rational basis. [Although
there may have been a rational basis for restricting note-taking
in the past, when courtroom disruption was an everyday
occurrence,] at present we have reached the point where
consideration for the taking of notes by spectators is lacking,
and hereafter must recognize that concern for the taking of
notes by spectators is demanded.196
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Repeta provides a clear indication that
Japan’s constitutional provisions evolve as Japanese society changes.
Although Article 20’s legislative history indicates an intent that the courts
loosely construe its provisions, Japan’s constitutionalism requires that they
also take into account the country’s current situation; this constitutionalism
should hold special importance for Japan in light of the fact that SCAP
drafted the constitution’s text. 197 Thus, in terms of Article 20 and other
constitutional rights, the Repeta case indicates that the boundaries of Japan’s
rights, as defined by Article 12’s public welfare provisions, will change over
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time as Japan’s people and the circumstances in which they live also
change.198
5.

Taking Public Policy into Account, a Narrow Interpretation of the
Prohibitions in Articles 20 and 89 Best Serves Japan’s Public Welfare

To determine whether Japan’s current societal situation calls for
stricter or looser interpretation of Articles 20 and 89 requires examining
public policy considerations. Where, as here, different constitutional
provisions compete (that is, Articles 20 and 89 compete against Article 12),
the Japanese Supreme Court has held that weighing public policy becomes
all the more important.199
Tanaka v. Nishiwaki provides a good example of this principle in
action. 200 In limiting the inviolable right to own or to hold property,
embodied in the letter and purpose of Article 29 of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court found that changed circumstances had made it more
important to require land-owners to show justifiable cause before removing
renters who have greater need for the land.201 In the spirit of Tanaka, the
Court should place greater emphasis on examining changed circumstances
and determining which policies would benefit from a narrow interpretation
of the prohibitions in Articles 20 and 89.
When SCAP drafted these articles, it feared Japanese re-militarization.
As part of its strategy to prevent that from happening, SCAP inserted
Articles 20 and 89.202 In the decades since the close of World War II, the
Japanese people and their religions no longer face the threat of State Shintō,
or of the state otherwise co-opting religion.
Instead, the Japanese people and their state have been threatened by
religiously-motivated violence and religions used for fraud. On March 20,
1995, the religion Aum Shinrikyō staged a coordinated attack on the Tokyo
subway system; in that attack, the group released the nerve gas Sarin, killing
thirteen people and injuring nearly a thousand more.203 Along with religious
198
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extremism, Japan has also had to deal with allegations of religions
defrauding its members.204
In both situations, the government dealt with these threats judiciously.
Although the government ultimately disbanded Aum Shinrikyō, “[t]he sect’s
crimes include[d] not only a large-scale indiscriminate terrorist attack, but
also kidnapping, drugging, homicide, the production of weapons of mass
murder, and conspiracy to commit armed insurrection.”205 Considering these
crimes, and the lives lost and negatively impacted because of Aum,
disbandment and criminal prosecution were necessary to protect the public
welfare. Without a lenient interpretation of Article 20, the government could
not have adequately dealt with the threat Aum presented.
The public also vehemently called for disbanding the religion Risshō
Koseikai after a series of scathing articles by the Yomiuri newspaper in the
1950s.206 Although the Diet launched an investigation in response to the
newspaper attacks, which ultimately criticized the religion, the executive
branch, through the Ministry of Education, kept the Diet in check and
worked with Koseikai to resolve the incident.207 In the end, Koseikai came
out stronger than before,208 whereas in the Meiji Era, Koseikai would have
seen its leaders arrested for lèse-majesté and been either disbanded or forced
by the government to alter its doctrines.209
Based on the government’s demonstrated ability to even-handedly
balance religious freedom with the public welfare and the lack of any real
threat of re-establishing State Shintō, there is no readily apparent policy
justification for rigidly applying Articles 20 and 89—their original purpose
is safely being served.
Japan’s policy favoring broad judicial discretion also benefits from
narrowly interpreting the prohibitions in Articles 20 and 89. This policy
objective explains why Japan’s Constitution contains so many vague
provisions such as the “public welfare” provisions. Kenzō Takayanagi 210
explained the purpose behind the current constitution’s vagueness this way:
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To establish detailed restrictive provisions in the Constitution
itself might result, on the one hand, in narrowing the area of
independent discretion as expressed by the exercise of the high
intelligence of the Supreme Court and, on the other, in
imposing contemporary views on later generations by means of
the Constitution itself. It is the intent of the Constitution of
Japan to provide elasticity, not by resorting to frequent
constitutional revision, but by determining through the exercise
of good sense of the Supreme Court the limitations on
fundamental human rights in accordance with changes from
period to period.211
Under this framework, it makes sense that as the threat of State Shintō
decreases over time, Articles 20 and 89 need not remain the robust
prohibitions that their text originally embodied. With SCAP’s original
purpose served, these provisions now serve only to ensure that people
remain free to exercise their religious beliefs and religious conscience.
Strict separation no longer makes sense because, as demonstrated here, a
government-funded ceremony or stipend does not generally prevent people
from being able to attend worship services or otherwise exercise their
personal beliefs.
Without the threat of revived State Shintō, Article 20 only serves to
protect free conscience in two very distinct forms. One form serves to shield
the people from legislation that would impose religious laws, such as Canon
Law 212 or Shari‛a Law, 213 which is in no way a current threat. More
pressing, Article 20 serves to protect religions from the people. Popular
opinion in Japan distrusts religions and believes they should no longer enjoy
tax privileges. 214 In such a political climate, there simply exists no
compelling reason to keep the government from engaging with religious
groups to ensure their continued freedom.
A lack of strong policies justifying strict separation, however, does not
necessarily mean that Japanese courts should narrowly construe the
prohibitions in Articles 20 and 89. There must be a legitimate public policy
objective served by interactions between the state and religion. As the Aum
incident indicates, one such policy is that the government must have
freedom to regulate religions where public safety is at stake. Another policy
211
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is to protect religion’s very existence. To do so, the government must also
have the freedom to afford those groups various privileges such as tax
exemptions and the right to acquire property in the organization’s name.
The goal of fostering civil society provides another public policy not
yet examined, which may also serve to restore public trust in religion.215
Japan’s religious civil society organizations provide public benefits in many
ways, including fighting poverty, crime, and drug addiction; operating
schools, museums, parks, and hospitals; operating homes for orphans, the
elderly, and the handicapped; organizing efforts for community selfimprovement; and advocating social policies in legislatures and in courts.216
Governments can, when it is done properly, directly achieve the goal of
improving civil society by providing public funds and other financial
benefits to civil society groups for services rendered, or through subsidies to
provide these services to others.217 In both the United States and Japan, the
state contributes more capital to civil society organizations than any other of
these groups’ funding sources.218 Without government support, it is safe to
say that many civil society organizations would no longer have the means
necessary to operate. So long as public funds do not come with excessive
strings or other circumstances that hinder these organizations’ independence,
civil society will be improved.219
Japan, by permitting the state and religions to liberally interact, will
become safer, will give its religions a better chance of survival, and will
improve its society as a whole through the increase in social capital. 220
Although many benefits come from increasing religious interaction, Japan
must still guard to prevent government discrimination against religions. To
address this concern, the Japanese Supreme Court should adopt a new test
for balancing the freedom of religion with the public welfare.

215
This comment uses Robert Pekkanen’s definition of civil society: the “organized, nonstate,
nonmarket sector.” ROBERT PEKKANEN, JAPAN’S DUAL CIVIL SOCIETY: MEMBERS WITHOUT ADVOCATES 3
(2006).
216
Helen Hardacre, Religion and Civil Society in Japan, 31 JAPANESE J. OF RELIGIOUS STUD. 389,
393 (2004); HARDACRE, supra note 204, at 135.
217
Robert Pekkanen, Molding Japanese Civil Society: State-Structured Incentives and the Patterning
of Civil Society, in THE STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN JAPAN 116, 116-18 (2003).
218
PEKKANEN, supra note 215, at 71.
219
Pekkanen, supra note 217.
220
For an introduction to the concepts of civil society and the benefits of social capital, see ROBERT
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).

MARCH 2012

B.

SEPARATION OF RELIGION AND STATE IN JAPAN

397

A New Test: Balancing Religious Freedom with the Public Welfare

Japanese courts, influenced by U.S. jurisprudence, frequently apply
balancing tests to decide legal questions.221 The purpose and effects test
discussed in this comment provides one such example. Although this
comment proposes abandoning that test, the Court should replace it with
another balancing test. Balancing is critical because every case that invokes
Article 20 will always implicate Article 12’s public welfare doctrine. The
courts cannot simply leave such conflicting constitutional provisions of
equal legal importance in conflict, but must reconcile the provisions by
weighing the interests surrounding each article.
As a part of this new balancing test, Japanese courts should review
allegations of state misconduct under a rebuttable presumption of
constitutionality. As in any lawsuit, the plaintiffs carry the initial burden of
proof. As a practical matter when reviewing government action, Japanese
courts will, and already do, impose a heightened burden to rebut Japan’s
long-standing presumption favoring the government. It has been argued that
Japan’s courts do this as a matter of institutional self-preservation as a coequal branch of government. In the past, the Diet has taken years to respond
to Supreme Court decisions holding laws unconstitutional.222 Because the
Japanese courts to date have not been fully treated as a coequal branch of
government, a heightened burden must be met before a constitutional
violation will be found. By requiring a higher standard, the judicial system
assures itself that any case of misconduct that meets that standard will likely
get the attention of the other branches of Japanese government.223
Under this standard for judicial review, the courts should weigh the
public welfare against the principles of freedom and separation of religion,
as the courts do in every case implicating constitutional rights. Based on the
preceding sections, proper considerations for the public welfare include 1)
public safety, and 2) the improvement of civil society. Freedom of religion
and the separation of religion from the state are guided by 1) the threat of
reestablishing a state religion, 2) whether the religious activity engaged in by
the state works to the detriment of other religions, and 3) whether the
government actor has denied other religions the opportunity to receive
similar public benefits or recognition.
221
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Weighing these factors, the courts should ask whether the plaintiffs
have shown a probable threat to religious freedom by the state. In answering
these allegations, the state can defend by showing weaknesses in the
plaintiffs’ arguments or by demonstrating that the public welfare outweighs
any concerns raised by the plaintiffs. In cases such as the Aum Shinrikyō
Dissolution case, where the government totally disbands a religion, the
plaintiffs will easily meet their burden and the government will necessarily
have to demonstrate a strong countervailing threat to public safety. But in
other cases like Tsu City or SDF Enshrinement, where no religion has been
denied a public benefit and no person has been prevented from exercising
their faith, the government can argue that the plaintiffs failed to meet their
burden, or easily defend by pointing to the public benefit supplied by such
activities.
V.

CONCLUSION

The era of government intolerance of religion in Japan is over. State
Shintō is dead and religions no longer fear arbitrary dissolution or doctrinal
revision by the hands of the state. To cement these gains, the Japanese
Constitution separates religion and state within the context of public welfare.
However, the Constitution does not define the extent of this separation for
the public welfare. To resolve this ambiguity, many scholars have called for
interpreting the Constitution to require strict separation. But the Japanese
Supreme Court has consistently held otherwise without providing any
consistent indication as to the proper limits on separation.
To resolve this issue, this comment has analyzed Articles 20 and 89 of
Japan’s Constitution, and interpreted those articles in light of the intent
behind their ratification and current public policy. The result is an
interpretation that narrowly construes the prohibitions of Articles 20 and 89
so as to permit a broad degree of interaction between religion and the state
for the continued benefit of Japan, while maintaining a vigilant watch for
renewed disparate treatment of religions.

